

“Electronic voting is in danger”

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Draft of the Election Law

- §48. Verification of the i-vote
 - (1) The voter can verify whether the vote given by internet voting has been sent to i-voting system according to the voter's intention.
 - (2) Verification procedures are established by Electoral Commission.

I-voting protocol since 2005




(1): ID-card authentication



(2): List of candidates




(3): $\text{Sig}_V(\text{Enc}_S(\text{Rnd}, \text{Vote}))$



- Parliamentary elections 2011
 - 24.3% of all the voters i-voted
 - Proof-of-concept malware attack
 - Very high political interest on the subject

Problems I: Manipulation



Problems II: Revocation

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
8. märts 2011

Käesolevaga esitan kaebuse 2011. aastal Riigikogu valimisel elektrooniliselt antud häälte tühistamiseks.

Problems III: Reputation



I-voting with vote auditing



Protocol design decisions

- Verification environment
 - Mobile vs. PC vs. kiosk
- Transport of randomness
 - Paper, USB, QR
- Verification in time
 - After the election verification – problems
- Verification algorithms
 - Brute-force vs. user input

How to apply verifiability?

- How to communicate verifiability so, that it adds to the confidence?
- How to get voters to actually verify?
 - How to get them to report errors?
- What can be done in case of an incident?
 - What to do if the situation escalates?
- How to prevent few dishonest from spoiling the party for others?

“Electronic voting is in danger”

- “Internet banking is secure, therefore e-voting can be secure”
- “Liars are real threat, not malware”
- “Verifiability is too complex – look at Norwegian problems”
- “People do not understand verifiability”
- “Secret agenda is to get rid of e-voting”
- “I have secure e-voting protocol”
- “Nobody is going to use it”

Thank you!

- Discussions